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ABSTRACT
In mid October of 2000, a rupture occurred at the bottom of a coal waste reservoir owned by Martin
County Coal Corporation (MCCC-Massey). Impounded slurry and sludge materials from the reservoir traveled
through underground mine works and burst through two mine portals on opposite sides of the mountain
releasing more than 300 million gallons of coal waste into creeks and waterways of Martin County, KY. This
paper examines people’s reactions to the Martin County coal waste disaster by examining levels of reported
concern and perceptions of risk across the impacted community of Martin County in comparison to similar coal
mining communities in the same watershed as well as elsewhere in Kentucky and West Virginia. Door-to-door,
drop-off/ pick-up methods were used to survey people’s perceptions. As predicted, findings show a significant
difference in public opinion over the risks associated with coal waste impoundments between the impacted
county in comparison to other counties. The other robust predictors of perceived risks were quality of life and
trust measures. Other factors found to be significant in some previous studies of risk perceptions, such as home
ownership and occupation could also account for some differences in risk perceptions within and across
counties. Overall, we conclude that our survey findings on trust are consistent with others who have theorized
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about the institutional interconnection between public trust and risk concerns regarding technological hazards.
In our discussion, we address the need for government agencies, that are responsible for responding to and
mitigating environmental hazards, to act in ways that merit public trust, restore public confidence, and alleviate
public anxiety. 
Just after midnight on October 11, 2000, a rupture occurred at the bottom of a
coal waste reservoir owned by the Martin County Coal Corporation (MCCC-
Massey). Impounded slurry and sludge materials traveled through underground
mine works and burst through two mine portals releasing more than 300 million
gallons of coal waste into creeks and waterways of Martin County, Kentucky. The
sludge contained high concentrations of heavy metals and covered some areas with
more than six feet of residue that had to be removed as part of the cleanup process.
Cleanup and removal operations were initiated immediately after the event and
were completed about six months later. However, public concerns about long-term
contamination persisted for some time.
The impoundment failure in Martin County was the largest coal waste spill in
U.S. history (Mueller 2000a) and was nearly twice the size of the 1972 Buffalo
Creek, West Virginia coal waste disaster that killed more than 120 persons and
injured hundreds of others (Erikson 1976). While the event did not result in the loss
of human life, it inundated creek banks and disrupted public water intake systems
in communities along the Big Sandy River and through to the Ohio River. The
Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources documented extensive
environmental damage to the area watershed extending beyond local creeks into the
Big Sandy, including 60-miles of fish kill (Davis 2001). As the sludge plume moved
downriver, towns in both Kentucky and West Virginia were placed in a heightened
state of alert and made preparations to close water intakes and rely on emergency
water provisions. 
In Martin County, the public water intake was temporarily shut down and an
emergency water line was routed from an unaffected creek for months following the
spill (Ball 2000). After a series of disruptions in the temporary supply, which
included a loss of water service on Christmas Eve, the water utility began to draw
water from its permanent intake on the impacted Tug Fork of the Big Sandy River.
Our field research showed that there were many complaints about the quality of the
public water and widespread public fear that the water was contaminated and posed
a health threat. Though the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
other officials proclaimed the water “safe,” this did not alleviate public concern
(Adkins 2001a, 2001b; Ball 2001). Local concerns culminated during a March 2001
public meeting. One of the things that residents realized was that, among other
2
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things, EPA officials did not have accurate information concerning the source of
water, as officials were seemingly unaware that the county had shifted to its
permanent water intake several months earlier (McSpirit, Hardesty, and Welch
2002:48). Overall, our field research indicated that the coal waste spill had a
significant effect on collective and individual perceptions of risk and these findings
were reinforced in our survey results which are reported in the following paper. 
This paper examines risk perceptions in the aftermath of the Martin County
coal waste spill, based on surveys conducted in two Kentucky counties (Martin and
Perry) and two counties (Mingo and Wyoming) in West Virginia. The four counties
that comprise our sampling frame are largely representative of the Central
Appalachian coal mining region and therefore, can provide some important insights
into risk concerns over coal waste impoundments among coalfield residents. We
naturally hypothesize and expect that risk concerns will be higher among residents
in the impacted community of Martin over other counties. 
Apart from the event itself, public perceptions of risk are influenced by
institutional and political responses that are socially constructed. While confidence
in regulatory agencies is critical to maintaining a sense of security, technological
accidents and disasters challenge this trust. Slovic, Layman, and Flynn (1991) have
suggested that public fear and opposition to hazardous technologies often reflects
a crisis in confidence in institutional managers and regulators. In addition,
conceptual work on social capital and disasters suggests that risk perceptions are
also influenced by quality of life and community well-being (Ritchie and Gill 2007).
The following paper examines the above influences, as well as other
sociodemographic factors, in understanding public concerns over coal waste
impoundments in Appalachia. 
Risk Perceptions and Disasters
Distinctions between natural and technological disasters have been debated in
the disaster literature for several years (e.g., Couch and Kroll-Smith 1985; Kroll-
Smith and Couch 1991; Gill and Picou 1998; Quarantelli 1985, 1992, 1998). Instead
of reifying these distinctions, we can use them to examine events on a natural-
technological continuum with overlapping qualities and effects (e.g., Gill 2007; Gill
and Ritchie 2006; see also Green et al. 1990). Compared to natural disasters,
technological disasters tend to be more damaging to the social fabric of impacted
communities (Erikson 1976, 1994; Freudenburg 1997; Gill 1994; Gill and Picou
1998; Picou et al. 1992; Ritchie 2004; Ritchie and Gill 2007) and cause greater
psychosocial stress and disruption (Ahearn and Cohen 1984; Baum and Fleming
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1993; Baum et al. 1992; Edelstein [1988] 2004; Freedy, Kilpatrick and Resnick
1993; Freudenburg and Jones 1991; Gleser, Green, and Winget 1981; Green et al.
1990; Green and Lindy 1994; Picou and Gill 1997; Smith and North 1993; Smith
et al. 1986; Vyner 1988). One reason for these differences is that technological
disasters represent a loss of control over processes perceived to be controllable whereas
natural disasters result from processes beyond human control (Baum and Fleming
1993). Loss of control fosters perceptions of recreancy; that is, “the failure of experts
or specialized organizations to execute properly responsibilities to the broader
collectivity with which they have been implicitly or explicitly entrusted”
(Freudenburg 2000:116; see also Freudenburg 1993; Freudenburg and Pastor
1992). Damage to public trust and security is heightened when these events involve
toxic substances that elude detection by human senses and create long term
uncertainty. Erikson (1994) refers to these events as ‘a new species of trouble.’
“Technological disasters and resulting environmental contamination represent
not only ‘a new species of trouble,’ but a special brand of risk as well” (Ritchie
2004:85). Risks are always constructed in sociocultural and individual contexts
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Furthermore, contemporary conceptions of risks
are situated in conditions of late modernity (Beck 1992, 2001; Giddens 1990, 1991).
As Beck states, “[world risk society’s] central themes and perspectives have to do
with fabricated uncertainty within our civilization: risk, danger, side-effects,
insurability, individualization and globalization” (2001:19). These collective
constructions include issues of trust, particularly in institutions to act responsibly.
Here, Giddens (1990, 1991) situates ontological security within a balance of trust
and acceptable risk. In modernity, technological risks are typically defined as
publicly acceptable when industry and regulatory performance have tended to
win—or at least manage—public confidence and public opinion. However, public
insecurity, anxiety, and distrust are heightened when technological hazards become
dangers because of slippages or failures in risk management. 
Under conditions of modernity, this sense of collective security rests upon a
balance of trust and acceptable risk. Giddens states, “if basic trust is not developed
or its inherent ambivalence not contained, the outcome is persistent existential
anxiety” (1990:100). Collective feelings of dread and anxiety are exacerbated each
time government or industry officials attempt to conceal, misrepresent, and/or
ignore environmental and public health risks posed by technology in favor of
creating a regulatory response structure that would buttress industrial and
economic activity (Bethel 1972; Bethel and McAteer 1978; Gephart 1984; Levine
1982; Molotch 1970; Picou and Gill 2000; Slovic, Layman and Flynn 1993). 
4
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The nexus between public insecurity/distrust and social constructions of
technological risks has been empirically documented in survey research on public
risk perception. Bord and O’Connor (1992), for example, found low levels of trust
in local, state and federal officials as increasing overall levels of concern over
cleanup and mitigation of a toxic chemical site. Freudenburg (1993) found that
those who reported no trust in science and technology, business capability, and the
federal government were significantly more likely to report high levels of concern
over a nuclear waste facility. Slovic et al. (1991) contend that breakdowns of public
trust in the scientific, industrial and regulatory apparatus tend to increase public
fear levels that, in turn, may lead to heightened opposition to industries and
technologies which are seen as dangerous. Other studies have identified similar
interconnections between trust and reported levels of anxiety among the public
(e.g., Kasperson, Golding and Tuler 1992; Desvousges et al. 1993, Spies et al. 1998;
Flynn et al. 1992). Thus, individual feelings about trust and perceptions of risk are
seemingly bound and contingent upon macro systems and structural conditions that
create and maintain either a sense of security or insecurity. 
Case research on technological disasters provides additional insights into these
micro-macro linkages. Case studies of the Santa Barbara oil spill (1969), Buffalo
Creek coal waste flood (1972), Love Canal hazardous waste contamination (1978),
Three Mile Island nuclear accident (1978), Centralia underground mine fire (1962-
1987), Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989), and other communities impacted by
technological mishaps reveal patterns of responses that contribute to how risks are
social constructed and interpreted: First, conflict emerges between the principle
responsible party, government agencies, stakeholder groups, and the public over the
magnitude and extent of harm and appropriate responses to be taken—in some
cases there may even be denial of any problem/responsibility and thus, no response.
Contending groups may emerge to voice public concerns, present claims, and try
to persuade government officials to act on their behalf. Particularly in cases of
contamination, a polarization among the public may even develop as individuals
interpret the situation differently; regulators, responsible parties and contending
stakeholders use various scientific means to legitimate their claims. The claims can
also involve legal action, but litigation is sometimes a long, drawn-out affair that
often leaves plaintiffs with diminished faith in the legal system as well. In the end,
whatever the resolution, communities and victims of technological events may have
lingering concerns about the health, safety, and security of their community, as well
as diminished trust in authorities, along with a heightened sense of awareness that
a similar event might befall them and their community again.
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Case studies have shown that political influences on regulatory responses to
technological risks, hazards, and disasters are often at odds with public sentiment.
For example, in the aftermath of Santa Barbara oil spill, legal actions by citizens to
impose a moratorium on offshore drilling in local coastal waters were thwarted by
the federal government, which systematically underestimated the magnitude of the
spill and damages to the coastal environment (Molotch 1970). In their study of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, Picou and Gill (2000) found stress, anxiety, and social
disruption to be compounded by a politically charged cleanup, site mitigation, and
impact assessment process that contributed to further declines in institutional trust
and increases in political skepticism among local residents. 
Moreover, conflicting scientific interpretations of data on physical impacts
combined with different regulatory approaches to risk abatement and site
mitigation politicizes agency responses and sometimes leads to community
mobilization and citizen/ stakeholder activism (Clark 1988; Etzkowitz 1984;
Sterling and Arundel 1985). Citizen responses to a toxic waste site at Love Canal
(Fowlkes and Miller 1987; Levine 1982) and to the nuclear accident at Three Mile
Island in Pennsylvania (Walsh 1987, 1988) demonstrate conditions of political
conflict and the inability of science to provide absolute proof. Moreover, these
events demonstrate how ambiguity inherent in exposure to contaminants can
polarize residents into activists and those that want to downplay or discount
potential risks and hazards. Many case studies describe social corrosion from these
internal community controversies over definitions of risk (Erikson 1976;
Freudenburg and Jones 1991; Kroll-Smith 1995; Gill and Picou 1998). 
Hypotheses 
Literature on community impacts of technological disasters suggests the
following standard hypotheses: 1) Martin County residents (impact area) will have
higher levels of risk perceptions than residents living in less affected areas; 2)
Martin County residents will have lower levels of institutional trust than other
residents and 3) will report lower levels of overall quality of life than other
residents. 
Other conceptual work on risks and technological disasters suggests two other
hypotheses regarding general attitudes toward risks: 1) levels of institutional trust
will be inversely related to risk perceptions; and 2) quality of life levels will also be
inversely related to perceived risks. In addition, some groups face greater
vulnerabilities in the wake of a disaster than others, but the research is less clear on
the relationships between sociodemographic variables and risk perceptions in the
6
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aftermath of technological disasters (e.g., see Picou and Gill 1997). When
significant relationships have been found, females tend to be more stressed and have
higher levels of risk concern than males (e.g., see Hamilton 1985; Levine 1982),
while older individuals tend to be less stressed and concerned (e.g., Fowlkes and
Miller 1987; Hamilton 1985; Kroll-Smith and Couch 1990). In one case, higher
income households showed more stress and concern over disasters impacts
(Hamilton 1985), but in another, homeowners tended to downplay risks (Fowlkes
and Miller 1987). Other research shows individuals employed in an ‘offending’
industry as having less stress and risk concern (Kroll-Smith and Couch 1990;
Levine 1982; Walsh 1987) and still other case studies have tended to verify
occupation as a possible predictor of risk perceptions in environmentally impacted
communities (Brody and Fleishmann 1993; Kroll-Smith and Couch 1990; Levine
1982; Picou and Gill 1997). 
Bord and O’Conner (1992), on the other hand, note that under conditions of
“imminent threat” as in the case of a technological disaster or accident—where
overall public fear levels might be heightened—demographic factors may lose some
of their predictive power in accounting for differences in reported levels of concern.
Consequently, we expect demographic predictors to have less of an influence in
Martin County and perhaps more of an influence in explaining variations in public
risk perceptions in non-impacted communities. Although the influence of
sociodemographic factors on risk perceptions remains tenuous, public trust and
confidence in corporate actors and governmental agencies remains a consistent and
robust predictor of perceived risk. Therefore, we expect that of all our variables,
institutional trust/ distrust will be a consistent and significant predictor of risk
perceptions (Dietz, Dan and Shwom 2007). 
Methodology
Our methodological approach uses an ex post design that requires the
identification of an area (control community) that compares to the impact area in
sociodemographic, economic, and physical characteristics but differs by event
impacts (see Gill and Picou 1998). We first identified Perry County, Kentucky as
our initial control community. Perry County is similar to Martin on several
characteristics. As Table 1 shows, both Perry and Martin are located in eastern
Kentucky, and both rely on coal extraction for a significant portion of their
economic production. Likewise, both counties have roughly one coal waste
impoundment every 30 to 50 square miles. Perry County also shares somewhat
similar population, poverty, and education characteristics with Martin County. But
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while Perry residents were well aware of the Martin County coal waste disaster,
their county was not directly impacted by the spill because of its location in a
different watershed (Kentucky River) than that of Martin (Big Sandy River). 
Our research team surveyed Martin County in the spring (March) of 2001 and
Perry County in the fall (September) of 2001 on coal waste impoundments, water
quality, quality of life, and institutional trust levels. In 2005 (April), under another
grant contract, we surveyed citizens in Mingo and Wyoming Counties in West
Virginia on the similar issues related to coal mining, environmental quality and coal
waste impoundments. These counties were chosen because they too are heavy coal
producing counties with a number of coal waste impoundments present in each
county. As with Martin and Perry, Table 1 shows that there is roughly one
impoundment per 30 to 50 square miles. Moreover, Mingo County is located in the
same watershed as Martin County (Big Sandy) and had its water supply temporarily
disrupted by the 2000 impoundment failure. Neighboring Wyoming County
borders Logan County, site of the 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster and many residents
remember this event. Again, Table 1 provides a summary of general geographic,
impoundment, population and economic characteristics of each of the four surveyed
counties in our sampling frame. 
Data used in this analysis were collected from surveys administered in all four
counties. Survey development began early on with field observations and semi-
structured field interviews with more than 30 Martin County residents. From our
field observations and interviews, we identified a number of community-based
concerns to be addressed in our survey. We then modified standard community
impact and risk assessment surveys used by Picou and Gill (1995a; 1995b) and
Freudenburg (1993) to reflect events across our particular case. Prior to
distribution, surveys were pretested in undergraduate sociology classes at Eastern
Kentucky University (EKU), whose student population primarily hails from eastern
Kentucky. Using feedback from these students, we made revisions and further fine-
tuned our survey.
Sampling Methods
Several university survey teams, consisting of one faculty member (driver) and
three undergraduate students (one to keep the record of contacts and two to go
door-to-door) distributed the survey to a sample of Martin County residents living
in the impacted area between Wolf Creek and Coldwater Creek (see Figure 1). This
area, the most densely populated part of the county, includes most of the county’s
12,000 residents (U.S. Census 2000).
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Table 1. A COMPARISON OF STUDY SITES BY U.S. CENSUS CHARACTERISTICS AND
OTHER PHYSICAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS.
MARTIN 
KY
PERRY
KY
MINGO
WV
WYOMING 
 WV
Land area (sq. miles) ...1 231 342 422 500
Active coal waste
impoundments .......2 5 16 11 5
Coal production–1999
(tons) . ......................3 10,398,740 12,812,669 20,695,645 9,987,079
Per capita coal
production–2000. ... 826 435 763 412
Population size .............1 12,578 29,390 27,100 24,225
% Below poverty level-
1999 . ........................1 37 29 25 22
High school grads-
2000 (% of pop. age
25+) . ........................1 54 58 60 64
B.A. or higher-2000 (%
of pop. age 25+) . ...1  9  9 7 7
No. employed in
mining . ....................4 932 1,209 1,556 1,016
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts. Coal Impoundment Location and1 2
Information System. Kentucky Geological Survey, Coal Production Data; West Virginia Mining3
Statistics, 1996-2006; Kentucky State Data Center, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional4
Economic Information System; West Virginia Mining Statistics. All data available from all sites
online, retrieved: June 2007.
A ‘drop-off/pick-up’ method comparable to that used elsewhere (Steele et al.
2001) was used to distribute surveys door-to-door. Surveys were distributed to
every sixth home on every primary, secondary, and ‘holler’ back road within the
defined survey area in March 2001, approximately five months after the event
occurred. Of the 467 surveys distributed, 290 surveys were successfully picked up
(response rate 62 percent). Several months later, we administered the same survey
to Perry County residents using similar drop-off/ pick-up methods and a similar
sampling interval. The Perry County sample was drawn from the city of Hazard
and from a rural catchment area between several large coal waste impoundments
(see Figure 1). Between our survey teams, we distributed a total of 502 surveys with
a total of 249 surveys completed (response rate 50 percent). 
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Figure 1. MARTIN AND PERRY COUNTIES, KENTUCKY: SURVEY DISTRIBUTION
AREAS.
10
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Figure 2 summarizes the areas of West Virginia that were surveyed in 2005
using the same systematic, drop-off/pick-up methods with teams of faculty and
undergraduates. In West Virginia, however, a larger sampling fraction (every 12th
house) was used due to a larger terrain to cover within a shorter, contracted time
period. In Mingo County, we distributed 363 surveys and picked up 157 (responses
rate 43%). In Wyoming County, we contacted 228 households and collected 96
surveys (response rate 42%). 
Figure 2. MINGO AND WYOMING COUNTIES, WEST VIRGINIA: SURVEY
DISTRIBUTION AREAS.
A review of demographic characteristics shows the Martin County sample to be
largely representative of the county’s general population insofar as our sample
reflected county employment rates and income levels. For example, 7 percent of our
sample was unemployed in March 2001 compared to official state unemployment
rates of 6 percent. With respect to income levels, the 2000 U.S. Census reported the
median household income in Martin County at $22,000.00 ($22,497.00) per year and
almost one-half (47 percent) of surveyed residents reported household incomes of
11
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$20,000 or less. In terms of education, however, our sample appears to be slightly
more educated than is typical in Martin County with 13 percent reporting more
than 16 years of education (a Bachelors Degree or Professional Degree), whereas
U.S. Census data for Martin County reveals 6 percent of the county workforce (over
the age of 25) holding at least a Bachelor’s Degree. 
Likewise, our Perry County sample was similar in census population
characteristics: Unemployment rates and income levels were comparable to the
general population although the sample’s educational level was higher than that
recorded for the county by the U.S. Census (26 percent for sample with a bachelor’s
or professional degree in comparison to 9 percent for county). The same can be said
for Mingo and Wyoming Counties, W.Va., a comparison of sample versus
population characteristics, shows U.S. Census data reporting 7 percent of both
Mingo and Wyoming County residents having a college degree or higher whereas
16 and 12 percent of surveyed residents reported having graduated from college.
Thus, our survey data may slightly over represent college-educated residents across
all four counties. 
Indicators and Measures
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable in our analysis was an index
measuring perceptions of risk from coal waste. Specific concerns about coal waste
were first identified from our semi-structured interviews. Particular concerns from
our interviews included coal waste toxicity, impacts on public water systems and
human health and not knowing the extent of environmental impacts. These items
were then developed for inclusion in the survey.
Our risk perception scale was based on selecting four survey items that best
measured the above expressed concerns among residents: Two of the items came
from responses to the stem, “How much of a problem are the following in your
county?” with response categories consisting of: not a problem (= 1); a slight
problem (= 2); a moderate problem (= 3); and a serious problem (= 4), with items
consisting of ‘coal waste’ and ‘drinking water.’ The other two questions came from
responses to the stem, “Please rate each item,” with response categories consisting
of: strongly disagree (= 1); disagree (= 2); neutral (= 3); agree (= 4); and strongly
agree (= 5) with items consisting of ‘we may never know the extent of the damage
caused by the spill in Martin County’ and ‘coal sludge is not hazardous.’ The latter
item was reverse coded to maintain symmetry with the other scales. The selected
four items were summed to create a risk perception index with scores ranging from
5 to 18 based on data from all four counties. Higher scores indicate greater concern
12
Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 22 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol22/iss2/6
RISK PERCEPTIONS AFTER DISASTER 95
over coal waste and impoundments. The average level of perceived risk was 14.7
(s=2.8) (" = .70).
Factor analyses on our survey data (n=476) showed the above survey questions
to be associated and separate from other survey questions that measured the
dimensions of public trust and quality of life. Factor loadings on the survey
questions that were used to construct our indices on risk, trust and quality of life
are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. FACTOR LOADINGS  FOR RISK PERCEPTIONS ON COAL WASTE, PUBLICa
TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS AND COMMUNITY QUALITY OF LIFE: MARTIN,
PERRY, MINGO AND WYOMING COUNTIES (N=476).
COMPONENT
 1 2 3
Concerns with coal waste. .................................................. .519 .429 .773
Concerns with drinking water. ......................................... .324 .460 .747
We may never know extent of damage caused by the
spill. ................................................................................... .445 .318 .737
Coal sludge is not hazardous. ............................................ -.302 -.213 -.636
Trust in the coal company.................................................. -.781 -.426 -.617
Trust in the local government. ......................................... -.794 -.582 -.470
Trust in state agencies. ....................................................... -.881 -.472 -.415
Trust in spill cleanup companies. ..................................... -.891 -.445 -.559
Trust in the EPA. ................................................................. -.851 -.366 -.337
Quality of local government. ............................................. .477 .690 .381
Quality of natural environment. ....................................... .437 .663 .656
Job opportunities. ................................................................. .390 .750 .327
Outdoor recreational opportunities. ................................ .331 .754 .336
Quality of life in community. ............................................. .391 .800 .357
As a place to raise children................................................. .337 .735 .282
Opportunities for young people. ....................................... .390 .789 .367
Note: The Extraction Method = Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method =Oblimin.a
An institutional trust index was created by summing six items from a series
based on the following stem: “Please tell us how you feel about each group or
agency.” Response categories consisted of: strongly disagree (= 1); disagree (= 2);
neutral (= 3); agree (= 4); and strongly agree (= 5). Specific items were, “I have
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trust in …:” 1) the coal company; 2) local government; 3) State agencies; 4) spill
clean-up companies; and 5) the Environmental Protection Agency. Our institutional
trust scale ranged from 5 to 25 with higher scores indicating greater levels of trust.
The scale mean was 12.4 (s=4.9) (" = .90).
A quality of life index was created by summing seven items from a series based
on the following stem: “In general, how would you rate your community?”
Response categories consisted of: very good (= 1); good (= 2); fair (= 3); poor (= 4);
very poor (= 5). Specific items were: 1) the quality of local government is…; 2) the
quality of the natural environment is…; 3) job opportunities are …; 4) outdoor
recreational opportunities are…; 5) the quality of life in this community is …; 6) as
a place to raise children, this community is …; and 7) opportunities for young
people are.... Items were reverse coded so that high scores reflected a better quality
of life. The scale ranged from 7 to 35 with a mean of 14.78 (s=4.5) (" = .82).
Socio-demographic variables included gender, age, education, income, mining
and home ownership and were coded as follows: Gender (0= male, 1 = female); Age
(number of years); Education (less than high school, high school, some college,
college degree); Income (under $10,000, $10,000-$20,000, $21,000-$40,000,
$41,000-$60,000 and over $60,000); home ownership (do not own = 0, own = 1).
Other sociodemographic variables, including presence of dependent children in the
household, source of drinking water (public versus private well), years lived in the
community, type of dwelling, and employment (employed, unemployed, housewife,
retired, disabled), were examined but are not included because preliminary analyses
indicated they were not significantly nor consistently associated with either the risk
index or any of the separate risk perception variables. We do, however, examine
employment linkages to the local coal economy by using the following question: “Is
any person in your household involved in the mining industry—either through
being employed, the sale of mineral rights, or through other business-related
activities?” (no = 0 and yes = 1). This question was broadly worded to protect the
anonymity of coal industry employees (coal miners especially) in the event that our
data was subpoenaed in future disaster-related litigation (see Picou 1996). Indeed,
a subpoena for survey and other data was received in April 2005.
Results
Community Comparisons
We begin with the following hypotheses: 1) Martin County residents (impact
area) will have higher levels of risk perceptions than residents living in the other
three counties; 2) Martin County residents will have lower levels of institutional
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trust than other residents; and 3) Martin County residents will report lower quality
of life levels than those in other coal producing counties. ANOVA results of our
analysis support all three hypotheses. Table 3 shows Martin County residents, on
average, reporting significantly higher scores (mean=16.4) on the risk perception
index than residents in Perry (13.3), Mingo (13.6) and Wyoming (13.6) counties
(F=63.1, df =603, sig. <.000). In addition, ANOVA tests show (F=19.5, df =614,
sig. <.000) Martin County residents reporting, on average, lower scores on
institutional trust (10.8) than residents in Perry (14.1), Mingo (13.4) and Wyoming
(11.9) counties. The same applies for quality of life with ANOVA results (F=60.2,
df =713, sig. <.000) significantly lower in Martin (12.4) than in the other three
counties respectively (17.2, 15.1, 15.0).
Table 3. ANOVA TESTS FOR LEVELS OF QUALITY OF LIFE, TRUST, AND RISK
PERCEPTIONS COMPARISONS BETWEEN MARTIN (IMPACTED AREA) AND
PERRY COUNTY, KENTUCKY AND MINGO AND WYOMING COUNTY,
WEST VIRGINIA (LESS-IMPACTED AREAS).
DESCRIPTIVE  ANOVA
n Mean F df Post Hoc Tests
Risk Perceptions
 Martin 
 Perry 
 Mingo 
 Wyoming 
255
178
113
58
16.4
13.3
13.6
13.6
63.1 603***
Martin > Perry, Mingo,a
Wyoming
Perry = Mingo, Wyomingb
Institutional Trust
 Martin 
 Perry 
 Mingo 
 Wyoming 
235
164
134
82
10.8
14.1
13.4
11.9
19.5 614***
Martin < Perry, Mingo,a
Wyoming
Perry > Wyoming;b
Perry=Mingo
Quality of Life
 Martin 
 Perry 
 Mingo
 Wyoming
266
229
139
89
12.4
17.2
15.1
15.0
60.2 713***
Martin < Perry, Mingo,a
Wyoming
Perry > Mingo, Wyomingb
* p=<.05; **p=<.01; *** p=<.001
Note: The first reported Scheffe Tests identify significant differences (.05) between the impacted areaa 
(Martin) to less impacted areas (Perry, Mingo, Wyoming).
 Note: The second reported Scheffe Tests compare and look for differences across less impacted areas,b
-Perry in comparison to Mingo and Wyoming Counties. 
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Given clearly observable differences in risk perceptions over coal waste
impoundments, as well as levels of public trust and quality of life between impacted
and less-impacted coal mining communities, our next line of inquiry was a separate
examination of, first, the Martin County sample and then our other set of cases.
This analysis might allow us to examine possibly different dynamics between
attitudinal and sociodemographic variables with risk perceptions between impacted
and less impacted communities. 
Correlation analyses presented in Table 4 strongly supports our hypotheses
regarding trust and quality of life as inversely related to coal waste risk concerns
in both disaster impacted (above diagonal) as well as in less impacted (below
diagonal) counties. In both sets of analyses, the correlation between trust and
quality of life with risk perceptions were robust (sig. <.000) in their statistical
significance (For Martin, trust r = -.57, q-life r = -.37; for other counties, trust r =
-.56. q-life r = -.45). 
Table 4. CORRELATION MATRIX FOR SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES, QUALITY
OF LIFE, TRUST AND RISK PERCEPTIONS: CORRELATIONS FOR
IMPACTED, MARTIN COUNTY, KENTUCKY (ABOVE DIAGONAL) AND FOR
LESS IMPACTED COUNTIES, PERRY, MINGO AND WYOMING COUNTIES
(BELOW DIAGONAL).
Risk Trust Q of Life Gender Age Ed Income Mining Home
Risk – -.57 -.37 .12 -.09 .01 -.17 -.15 -.14*** *** * * *
Trust -.56 – .42 -.07 .04 -.10 .15 .18  .04*** ** * ** *
Q of Life -.45 .60 – -.10 .03 .08 .21 .05  0.12*** *** **
Gender .09 .04 -.02 – -.29 .03 -.13 -.09 -.04*** *
Age .09 -.13 .00 -.12 – -.29 -.06 -.20 .25* ** *** ** ***
Ed .05 .02 .07 .08 -.21 – .45 .14 .04*** *** *
Income -.06 .07 .10 -.21 -.02 .39 – .32 .32*** *** *** ***
Mining -.13 .11 -.01 -.10 -.10 -.00 .27 – .17* * * * *** **
Home -.03 .03 .06 -.17 .31 .05 .30 .14 –*** *** *** **
p=<.05; p=<.01; p=<.001* ** ***
Table 4 also shows (sig. <.05) that within Martin County, higher income (r =
-.17), mining households (r = -.15) and homeowners (r = -.14) tended to slightly
downplay the possible environmental risks associated with coal waste
impoundments. In other counties, the only sociodemographic factor that was
significant was mining household (r =-.13) insofar as households tied to the mining
industry, as in the case of Martin County, tended to somewhat discount the
environmental risks associated with coal waste. 
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Correlation results also suggest that mining may also exert an indirect influence
on risk perceptions. Across both Martin (r =.18, sig. <.001) and other counties (r
=.11, sig. <.05), mining household was a significant predictor of levels of trust.
Here, households that were connected to the mining industry either through
employment or other business-related activities reported slightly less distrust of the
company, government, agencies and regulators than other households. Correlations
presented in Table 4 also show that other demographic factors such as income,
homeownership, gender and age may also be indirectly associated with risk
perceptions through their slight effect on either institutional trust or quality of life.
The above correlations are reinforced through block regression methods. Table
5 presents the standardized Beta coefficients and goodness of fit (adjusted R ) for2 
the following three respective models: Model 1 tests only the effect of place and
shows impacted place (.50) to be a robust predictor of risk perceptions over coal
waste impoundments (R =.24). The next model, Model 2 (R =.50) is perhaps our2 2 
most efficient model for predicting coal waste risk perceptions among Appalachian
residents: Living in the 2000 impacted area of Martin County (.30), institutional
trust (-.41) and quality of life (-.19) were principal factors in explaining risk
perceptions. Model 3 in Table 5 shows two sociodemographic characteristic as
possibly significant in predicting risk concerns, when controlling for impact area
 
Table 5. BLOCK REGRESSION FOR VARIABLES RELATED TO RISK PERCEPTIONS OF
COAL WASTE IMPOUNDMENTS AMONG APPALACHIAN RESIDENTS (N =
399)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a
Beta Beta Beta
Impacted Area
Martin (=1). ............ .50 .30 .29*** *** ***
Attitudes
Trust. ........................ -.41 -.39*** ***
Quality of Life......... -.19 -.19*** ***
Characteristics
Gender...................... .05
Age. ........................... .03
Income...................... -.03
Mining Households. -.09*
Home Ownership. .. -.08*
Adjusted R . ...................2 .24 .50 .51
* p=<.05; **p=<.01; *** p=<.001
Note: Model 2= Reduced Modela 
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and attitudes (trust and quality of life): Across counties, mining households (-.09)
and homeowners (-.08) tend to minimize the risks associated with coal waste
impoundments. 
Overall, our regression findings indicate that the main predictors of risk
perceptions are impact area, trust and quality of life. Other factors found to be
significant in some previous studies, such as industry employment and home
ownership could account for some of the possible differences in risk perceptions
over coal waste and coal waste impoundments across our four county area. Here,
the principal sociodemographic factor, based on a review of both correlation and
regression results, seems to be mining household. Those involved in the mining
sector were, predictably, more likely to minimize and discount the environmental
risks associated with coal waste impoundments and, based on other correlations,
were more likely to report higher levels of confidence in regulatory agencies and
government officials to keep them safe. 
Discussion: Agency Slippage and Public Distrust
Our survey findings suggest that the impact of the Martin County coal waste
spill on the attitudes and opinions of local residents echoes the findings of many
previous studies of post-disaster communities. While mining households were more
likely to downplay the risks associated with coal waste impoundments, survey
results indicate that compared to other households in other counties, Martin
Countians, irrespective of type of employment and occupation, expressed
significantly higher levels of distrust, as well as higher levels of concern about the
quality of life in their community and the future environmental risks posed by
impoundments and coal sludge in the wake of the 2000 impoundment failure. 
These survey findings reinforce the literature regarding heightened perceptions
of risk, public distrust and lower overall perceptions of quality of life in post disaster
communities. In addition, our survey findings validate our own case research in
Martin County. In the months following the spill, for example, interviews with local
residents indicated that many did not believe official claims from either the company
or government regulatory agencies that the water supply remained safe and
uncontaminated by the spill. Evidently interviewees distrusted the information
provided by the coal company and its representatives because the corporation had
an economic interest in minimizing the environmental risks associated with the spill
to circumvent possible liabilities. But many residents expressed equal levels of
distrust with government officials and regulatory agencies as they were seen as
connected to the coal company. 
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Such local suspicions and distrust over regulatory agencies likely developed
within the first days of the event when the EPA regional office (Region 4)
dispatched an on-site coordinator to oversee environmental assessment and cleanup
of the coal slurry spill. To the surprise of many, the coordinator located the
command and control center on coal company property, -a decision which seemed,
to many locals, to place the government in direct collusion with the corporation
from the start. When citizens later questioned officials about this decision, they
were told that the corporation (MCCC-Massey) had made computers and fax
machines available for their use (McSpirit, field notes March 18, 2002). 
Within the next days and weeks, the EPA began formal coordination of its
response actions with MCCC-Massey on company property, through a unified
command structure, under its authority under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Otherwise known as
“Superfund,” this law authorizes federal agencies to establish a unified command
post for state, federal and company officials when responding to environmental
releases that pose an imminent and substantial threat to the public and the
environment. But as the EPA worked with MCCC-Massey to begin cleanup,
assessment and response operations, such as setting up emergency water lines and
supplies, citizens continued to question the location of emergency services and
environmental recovery efforts on coal company property of which the public had
no access (Grayson 2000). 
As stated at the outset of this paper, the public was particularly concerned about
the impact of the spill on the watershed and drinking water. At the first public
meeting on October 17, citizens were further surprised to find that the EPA would
be relying upon state regulators and MCCC-Massey and its subcontractors to
collect water data to assess the environmental impact of the spill as opposed to
conducting its own independent federal assessment of the disaster’s impact (Adkins
2000). Throughout October, through the unified command post, the EPA, company
representatives and the state regulators, issued repeated declarations of public
water safety; yet public concerns about the safety of the water remained high
(Kentucky State Environmental Quality Commission 2004; McSpirit et al. 2002;
Scott et al. 2005). In the weeks and months ahead, reports came in about foul odors,
taste and consistency (a powdery substance) of the public drinking water, while
others reported developing skin rashes from washing and bathing. 
By November, allegations began to appear in the regional newspaper that
MCCC-Massey had been editing press releases from the unified command post.
When questioned, the EPA on-site coordinator (OSC) acknowledged that the
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corporation did have input into the press releases but denied that the corporation
had the final word. Nevertheless, the OSC also confirmed that he had not been in
Martin County when recent press statements had been released (Mueller 2000b).
By December, MCCC-Massey’s legal team declared the sludge spill “an act of God”
(Ball 2000), a legal plea which further angered local residents who saw the company
as attempting to shirk its responsibility for the disaster. 
A crucial series of events unfolded from January to March 2001, when the EPA
began negotiations with MCCC-Massey to yield its authority under CERCLA. In
a series of letters and closed door meetings, the EPA elected to settle with the
company for minor violations under the Clean Water Act. This shift in statutory
authority reversed several case precedents that had characterized coal waste as a
potentially hazardous substance. But, to be fair, there were other regulatory
statutes, namely -the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (the Beville
Amendment), that does not classify coal slurry as a hazardous material and this
point of law was used to provide legal justification for the negotiated settlement. In
the end, the shift away from CERCLA relinquished the federal government’s
authority to sue the company for damages to natural resources or to include the
public in any further environmental recovery efforts. In fact, based on an open
records review of who was represented in these negotiations, the record shows that
there was already little input from the public, county or state in these final
negotiations between EPA and MCCC-Massey. 
On March 13, 2001, local residents were informed of the EPA decision and
settlement at a final EPA public meeting. EPA Region 4 told the several hundred
residents present that the agency was yielding jurisdiction over final matters of
environmental cleanup, monitoring and restoration to the coal company. At this
meeting, the EPA went ahead and informed the public that the corporation would
not be fined for actions or inactions that caused the disaster, reasoning that the cost
of cleanup was punishment enough. Residents reacted angrily to the news. “Have
you been bought off?” one angry resident yelled from the back of the crowd (Adkins
2001a). 
We have written about these observations and interviews in more detail
elsewhere (see McSpirit et al. 2005; Scott et al. 2005) and they tend to show the
EPA often acting in ways that did not merit much trust and confidence of local
residents. Rather than acting in ways that demonstrated its independent authority
to protect the environment and human health, it appeared to residents that MCCC-
Massey, rather than the EPA, was taking the lead in environmental response and
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assessment and as one resident aptly put it, that is like “putting the fox in charge
of the henhouse” (McSpirit et al. 2005:41). 
Conclusion
In August 2002, in a major shift of events, the state of Kentucky, invoking its
own legal authority under CERCLA, sued the Martin County Coal Corporation for
$1 million in damages to the state’s natural resources. Still later, in March 2005, as
a result of year-long efforts by our research team, the Kentucky State
Environmental Quality Commission, and a final legislative act by Kentucky’s
General Assembly, $150,000 of the settlement was made available to conduct an
independent, outside assessment of the public water system with full citizen
oversight and participation. This independent research effort has been coordinated
by our research team at Eastern Kentucky University, with researchers at the
University of Kentucky, and in partnership with: 1) a group of concerned Martin
County citizens, 2) the county water utility and 3) the Kentucky State Division of
Water. Recently completed findings from this year-long independent, community-
based assessment of the public water supply yielded similar conclusions to earlier
assessments of no long-term impacts of the 2000 spill on public drinking water
quality or the public water supply (McSpirit and Wigginton 2006; LaSage and
Caddell 2006). Moreover, our evaluation of the public water plant, by an outside
evaluator, showed that due to changes in management and due to heavy oversight
by the state’s own Division of Water and Public Service Commission since the 2000
event, the water utility was making significant strides in management, treatment
and distribution of a good quality, water product (Hansen and McSpirit 2006).
These findings were made widely available to residents through a flyer that was
inserted in the county water district’s 2006 Consumer Confidence Report that was
sent to each household. Wide circulation of our findings was our effort at further
restoring public confidence in the water utility and drinking water supply and, as
a community development effort, was our effort at assisting the county in its own
efforts at community recovery. 
To close, our survey findings and case research reflect the literature on agency
slippage (recreancy), public distrust and heightened levels of public anxiety in the
face of technological breakdowns. But we believe that the community action
component of our research may have some important applications for others
working in the field of communities and disaster: Our initial case research and
survey findings showed, for example, a regulatory response that seemed to favor the
coal company and as a consequence, the governmental/ agency response did not
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merit nor warrant public trust or confidence. Since then our research team had been
advocating and working with others to push for more public involvement in
environmental recovery decisions in Martin County and for an independent outside
evaluation of environmental impacts of the sludge spill outside the purview of the
offending coal company. This advocacy between our team, local citizens, state
commissions and state regulatory agencies culminated in what we believe to be an
important legal precedent regarding the public’s legal rights in disaster response
and environmental assessment. The precedent being: The state legal opinion that
deemed that natural resource damage settlement monies could be used to fund and
initiate independent outside assessments of environmental impacts rendered by an
event and that these outside assessments could include full citizen oversight and
participation (for details, see McSpirit and McCoy 2005). This new precedent, we
believe, marks an important breakthrough in possibly loosening some of the hold
that industry has had over regulatory response, assessment and monitoring in the
face of technological hazards and disasters in the U.S. We encourage other
researchers, working in disaster-impacted communities to consider and invoke this
new precedent when applicable. 
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